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Data processing and telecommunications technologies and services are
rapidly merging into what is called "compunications," I or "teleinformat-
ics." 2 The merger of two previously discrete technologies has created a
domestic regulatory dilemma for the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC).asitstruggles to devise a scheme to regulate communications
common carriagewhile leaving data processing subject only to market-
place competition. 3 International confusion also has resulted because these
new services defy. functional classification, and no universal definitions
and standards have been established to coordinate the manner in which
they wilt be provided among nations. Notwithstanding the problem of
classification, the FCC has sought to define these services loosely in terms
of existing regulated telecommunications or unregulated data processing
services.
The FCC's attempt to establish a framework for existing technology
merely assumes that these hybrid services constitute a simple extension of
what is currently available. At some point, however, technological innova-
tion renders a telecommunications service so much like an information
processing service that the established semantic dichotomy breaks down.
While it would be imprudent to burden vendors of data processing services
with pervasive common carrier regulation, some mechanism is necessary
to safeguard the economic well-being of common carriers and the viability
of their essential services that will now be subject to greater competition.
To varying degrees, nations acknowledge this problem and allow commer-
cial, non-communications enterprises to provide such services under a
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modified type of government oversight. United States and foreign regula-
tory agencies, 4 however, employ various definitions, standards, and clas-
sifications to maintain a sharp dichotomy.
Ultimately, the conversion of all telecommunications transmission
media into a digital (electronic pulses) format from the present analog
(waveform) mode will foster an even greater consolidation of data process-
ing and telecommunications services. Emerging Integrated Services Digital
Network (ISDN) 5 will not distinguish between voice, record, facsimile,
data, or information transmission or manipulation. Until that time when
data processing and telecommunications merge completely, however,
problems in regulation and operation will abound.
This article chronicles the FCC's attempt to confront the confluence of
telecommunications and data processing technologies by fashioning a
regulatory scheme designed primarily for the United States. The Commis-
sion has chosen to apply this scheme, without significant qualification,
internationally. Given the different objectives and structure of United
States and foreign communications industries, the FCC's system cannot be
transplanted abroad without prior consultation and substantial modifica-
tion. After reviewing the international problems created by the Commis-
sion's application abroad of its newly developed scheme, this article
concludes with recommendations for resolving these conflicts that current-
ly threaten the well-being of carriers, customers, and international comity.
THE FCC COMPUTER INQUIRIES: MAPPING THE
COMMUNICATIONS/DATA PROCESSING TERRAIN
In the United States, the merger of communications and data processing
technologies has posed a threat to an existing regulatory system of estab-
lished jurisdictional limits, geared to defining the accessible markets for
certain carriers. 6 In a general sense, communications services have been the
subject of regulation while data processing has not. Because communica-
tions common carriers are now free to enter data processing markets, 7 it
was essential that the FCC establish structural safeguards "designed to
prevent common carriers from unfairly burdening their regulated com-
munications services with costs properly attributable to unregulated data
processing services. 8 In addition, because the structure of the American
communications industry is such that one enterprise may be engaged in
both communications service and data processing, the FCC had to define
criteria for categorizing particular services rather than regulating by indus-
try; regulation would apply only to communications service, with data
processing, even if provided by a communications carrier, generally free
from governmental oversight. In so doing, the Commission sought to
IMPACT OF REGULATION ON INT'L COMMUNICATIONS 191
freeze technological evolution in time so that it could craft semantic
categories that supposedly would define markets in perpetuity. Depending
upon its definition as data processing or telecommunications, a service and
the enterprises providing it could be subject to two vastly different operat-
ing rules and economic safeguards.
The FCC's Preliminary Classification of Combined Services
In 1966, the FCC began to develop comprehensive criteria to categorize the
new combined services. 9 Concentrating on how computerization was then
employed, the FCC first left unregulated data processing when used "for
operations which include, inter alia, the functions of storing, retrieving,
sorting, merging, and calculating data according to programmed instruc-
tions." 10 Computer-assisted telecommunicatons, "the transmission of
messages between two or more points via communications facilities where
the message remains unaltered," I I would, on the other hand, be regulated.
Soon realizing that a strict data processing/communications dichotomy
would not be feasible in view of technological advances, the Commission
acknowledged the need to specify hybrid grey areas. 12 These additional
definitions would still allegedly foster "maximum separation" 13 between
those services which communications common carriers could provide ex-
clusively and those services which any data processing enterprise could
offer free of regulation, having first acquired the necessary transmission
capacity pursuant to tariff from a regulated carrier. The FCC subsequently
found that the three subclassifications of data processing, and two sub-
categories of computer-assisted communications it had specified, could not
adequately classify the myriad of services that could now be jointly per-
formed by a central computer facility and terminals distributed throughout
a complete information processing and transmission network. 14
Despite rising doubt that "[t]he confluence of data processing and com-
munications may be such.., that it is no longer practical or possible, from
a regulatory point of view, to classify these activities ... ,,"15 the Commis-
sion would not forsake a regulatory regime ostensibly based on functional
criteria and bound by the then existing state of technology. In so doing,
however, the FCC recognized that technological advances had already
rendered an absolute data processing/communications dichotomy impos-
sible. Such a dichotomy could perhaps be applied in foreign nations where
one carrier merely provided all communications services, but not in the
United States, where private enterprises were engaged in both services.
The Commission subsequently opted to use broad service categories
that established a fundamental line of demarcation rather than considering
the specific nature of what was involved in a particular service. Thus,
"voice service" '6 and "basic non-voice" service 17 could be provided by
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communications entities without restriction. "Enhanced non-voice" ser-
vice, 18 on the other hand, was the term used to describe the new data
processing category that combined the active use of computerization for
data manipulation with telecommunications. Services falling within this
category would be restricted when performed by a communications com-
mon carrier. Again the Commission's stated purpose was to minimize the
need for it to make ad-hoc service evaluations or for the service provider
to package an offering in such a way as to fit within a preferred category.
The Commission attempted to establish a regulatory structure that distin-
guished between communications and data processing services offerings
without affecting the manner in which computerization was employed in
either category. 19 This definitional scheme was necessary because the
structure of the communication and data processing industries in the Unit-
ed States obligated regulatory intervention to ensure that carriers provid-
ing communications services could also enter data processing markets
without securing subsidies and artificial advantages accrued from their
communications ratepayers. 20
The Second Computer Inquiry Establishes
A Basic/Enhanced Services Dichotomy
The FCC concluded its attempt at line drawing in 1980, when it decided
on a division between "basic transmission services" and "enhanced ser-
vices." 21 Under this final scheme, "the Commission continued to require
common carriers to provide basic transmission services under tariff on an
equal basis to all customers." 22
The Commission defined a "basic transmission service" as "one that is
limited to the common carrier offering of transmission capacity for the
movement of information." 23 A carrier "essentially offers a pure transmis-
sion capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent in
terms of its interaction with customer supplied information." 24 Hence,
communications common carriage of basic transmission service is merely
the offering of a communications path that can be used to send either
voice, data, or video signals, depending upon the nature of the transmis-
sion line. 25
"Enhanced services" were defined as transmissions over a telecommuni-
cations network combined with computer processing that "act on the
content, code, protocol and other aspects of the subscriber's informa-
tion." 26 This category covered services that use computerization to offer
"additional, different, or restructured information . . .provided [to] the
subscriber through various processing applications performed on the
transmitted information," 27 or that use computers to process or store
information. 
28
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The Commission found that enhanced services and the terminal devices
customers attached to the communications network, customer premises
equipment (CPE), were not within the scope of its common carrier jurisdic-
tion. 29 It did find however, that certain aspects of these services and
devices were within its ancillary jurisdiction. 30 Such jurisdiction was ap-
propriate when the Commission needed to effect its overall public interest
goals while also limiting its common carrier jurisdiction and freeing data
processing from regulatory oversight. Accordingly, the FCC refrained from
regulating enhanced services, with the exception of requiring AT&T to
provide such service via a fully separate subsidiary because it alone pos-
sessed "sufficient market power to engage in effective anticompetitive
activity on a national scale and... [held] sufficient resources to enter the
competitive [enhanced services & CPE] market[s] through a separate sub-
sidiary." 3 ' This order was necessary "to prevent AT&T from burdening
its basic transmission service customers with part of the cost of providing
competitive enhanced services.., based on AT&T's market power and its
ability [without segregation] to undercut its competitive offerings with
profits from its monopoly services." 32
The Commission also distinguished between the provision of basic
transmission services and the offering of CPE that traditionally had been
"bundled" together. Rate regulation would continue over the provision of
transmission service, but CPE was to be sold separately in a burgeoning,
unregulated and competitive marketplace. 33
The FCC's revised definitions substantially clarified its regulatory pur-
view. In rejecting its prior definitional scheme, which attempted to classify
various types of enhanced information processing services, the Commis-
sion opted for looser line drawing to distinguish between communications
and information processing while recognizing that computerization could
serve purely communications objectives. 34 Under the new scheme, com-
munications carriers employing computerization to "facilitate economical,
reliable movement of information [that] does not alter the nature of the
basic service" could provide the service directly. 35 No separate subsidiary
was required when computer memory and storage functions were used
solely to expedite the switching and routing of an "analog or digital trans-
mission of voice, data, video, etc., information signals through a communi-
cations path." 36 When "additional, different, or restructured information
... through various processing applications performed on the transmitted
information" were involved, however, the service would be classified as
enhanced and would have to be provided through AT&T's separate sub-
sidiary 37 and by other carriers using separate books of account to allocate
costs properly. 38 While the Commission faced challenges to its scheme on
jurisdictional grounds and on the adequacy of its basic/enhanced services
dichotomy, given the existence of services 39 and equipment 40 which defy
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easy compartmentalization, it had successfully devised a domestic regula-
tory framework. A far more difficult task, though, has been the application
of this framework to the international telecommunications/data process-
ing marketplace.
THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS /DATA
PROCESSING MARKETPLACE
The intrinsic nature of international telecommunications and data process-
ing services precludes a simple extension of the FCC's Second Computer In-
quiry. For the most part, these two service categories have been provided
internationally by mutually exclusive enterprises. Unlike the fully com-
petitive marketplace that the FCC has sought to promote in the United
States, most foreign systems consist of a limited number of telecommuni-
cations entities operating under a government franchise or as government
monopolies. These foreign postal, telegraph, and telephone (PTT) entities
provide a complete set of communications services and have adopted rules
and policies that establish service, access, and pricing limitations in part to
ensure reliable, affordable, and universally available services at home.
Because these PTTs must serve a nation's total communications needs,
often without the freedom to enter other markets, they must temper their
zeal to exploit technological advances, which could prove profitable with
an absolute obligation to maintain the availability of some services, such
as postal operations, that are intentionally priced at less than cost. Other
services, such as international telex and telephone services, must be priced
far above cost to generate a surplus to cross-subsidize the underpriced
services.
Unilateral United States efforts to foster robust price and service compe-
tition thus face tremendous barriers, not only because most foreign nations
have but one telecommunications service provider, but also because prices
closely paralleling costs among discrete service categories may undermine
the PITs' ability to promote social and political policies through cross-
subsidization. 41
Conflicts Between Foreign PTT Service Obligations
And FCC Marketplace Goals
Foreign PITs are leery of competition, service diversity, and general struc-
tural changes because the need to cross-subsidize services promotes
maintenance of the status quo. While United States carriers and equipment
suppliers can tolerate cuts in profit margins to meet competitive demands
and can experiment with technological innovations or enter new non-
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communications markets, the PTTs must avoid conferring tangible finan-
cial benefits on one class of consumers if other users cannot afford to bear
higher costs and have no other options available.
Because good relations among nations require compromise and coordi-
nation, United States firms, accustomed to operating in a more competitive
domestic environment, must nevertheless comply with PTT-imposed re-
strictions that constitute essentially anticompetitive practices and policies.
Accordingly, the terms, conditions, and prices for some international ser-
vices to United States consumers are likely to be less attractive than those
that could be established if foreign PTTs operated competitively. 42 Indeed,
the opportunity for United States carriers and service providers to compete
aggressively is constrained by PTT-imposed limitations on which carriers
can gain access to a foreign nation's domestic network and what services
can be provided. 4
Given the need for operational and pricing stability, PTTs feel threat-
ened by an unregulated, enhanced services marketplace, and by the recent
proliferation of products and services caused, for example, by the FCC's
deregulation of CPE. Enhanced service providers have every incentive to
engineer the cheapest route between the United States and foreign destina-
tions. Because United States and foreign carriers have opted to discount
heavily large volume, private line services, the majority of new enhanced
services providers will seek to use bulk private lines and avoid higher
priced usage-sensitive international public switched networks designed for
the carriage of individual customers' telex and telephone calls.
Resale And Shared Use Of Private
Lines For Enhanced Or Basic Services
Any major shift toward greater use of private lines threatens to upset the
pricing policies and, in turn, the profitability of most PTTs that rely on
their public switched network as the fundamental telecommunications
pipeline and their primary source of revenues. Consequently, United
States entrepreneurs threaten to jeopardize this balance when they acquire
bulk private line packages, designed and tariffed for use by single, large-
volume users, and resell individual circuits to a large number of small-
volume users. This trend results in an international service dichotomy:
(1) The growing use of highly advanced, efficient, data compatible,
enhanced service networks carried over private-lines, presumed by
the PTT to serve only a small set of very large users, e.g., the U.S.
Department of Defense, major banks, aviation reservation systems,
etc., and
(2) The lowered use of the traditional international public switched
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network that will be saddled with small users who may be finan-
cially penalized from the concomitant drop in gross PTT revenues
resulting from greater use of private lines.
The FCC has hastened the emergence of this dichotomy through the
international application of the Second Computer Inquiry and by initiating a
review of American and foreign restrictions on the resale and shared use
of international transmission capacity. 44 Aiming to eliminate another ser-
vice barrier to robust competition, which already has accrued domestic
benefits, the Commission has injected more international operational com-
plexity and threatened the fragile legitimacy of American international
enhanced service providers. If the Commission leads an international cru-
sade to foster private line resale, it may disrupt the ability of carriers to
maintain discrete submarkets and to discriminate between customers on
the basis of usage volumes. While this will generate real financial and
service benefits to some users, the maintenance of rate discrimination,
which may not even have efficiency or cost justifications, preserves a
ubiquitous high-volume public switched international network.
Any policy or pricing initiative, which affords small retail users cheaper
options entailing a departure from the public network, jeopardizes PTT
objectives (e.g., subsidization of postal services from noncompetitive tele-
phone and telex rates, service stability, and operational control). Resale
authority offers enhanced service vendors and consumers "the opportunity
to select more accurately the lowest priced service that adequately meets
communications needs." 45 "[B]y purchasing discounted bulk ... services
.. and reselling them to smaller users.., arbitrageurs.., create pressure
on the underlying carrier to set rates for the discounted service which fully
recover the costs of providing that service." 46 However, the authorization
of new American customer options and alternatives to conventional access
to foreign locales without foreign consent is perceived by conventional
American carriers as unfair competition and by the PTTs as a threat to their
operational sovereignty, pricing policies, and financial well-being.
Existing American carriers have retaliated by refusing to convey or lease
capacity to international resellers without FCC certification that the resell-
ers constitute authorized common carriers. However, the refusal to lease
capacity conflicts with the Second Computer Inquiry policy that contemplates
ease in acquiring tariffed transmission capacity when used to devise an
unregulated enhanced service. 47 Carriers owning transmission capacity
likewise opposed reseller certification by the FCC on grounds that resale
activity would violate their existing tariff provisions, which prohibit resale
of international lines even if the process is an essential element to the
provision of an enhanced service.
On the foreign side, PTTs and their representative associations have
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used the various international telecommunications policymaking bodies 48
as fora to air their objections to private line resale. 49 With greater frequen-
cy, several PTTs threaten the elimination of the private line circuitry
option if resale (basic or enhanced) activity proliferates further. Such
-retaliation would drastically raise telecommunications expenses to large
users and eliminate the flexibility necessary to configure lines for special-
ized information processing applications. 50
While FCC elimination of American-based international resale and
shared use restrictions may free American enhanced service providers from
any regulatory oversight and afford them a greater opportunity to acquire
cheaper access to foreign locales, the Commission must not jeopardize the
positive working rapport that American carriers and government agencies
must maintain with their foreign counterparts. It is the potential for finan-
cial injury resulting from the proliferation of services and customers' de-
parture from the public switched network that prompts PTTs to limit the'
set of alternative means for access to a foreign nation's local distribution
facilities. The FCC cannot unilaterally foist upon its foreign counterparts
a new industrial and service structure without first assessing which set of
users and carriers stand to gain or lose from a related international resale
policy and the unqualified application of the Second Computer Inquiry. If a
foreign PT refuses to confer an operating agreement with a new United
States enhanced services provider because the PTT does not wish to permit
such a "resale" service and it intends instead to coordinate the provision
of new (enhanced) services only with its existing correspondents, then the
FCC's campaign for open entry and marketplace competition will un-
doubtedly be frustrated.
Unsanctioned enhanced services can, however, be carried unobtrusively
through PT domestic circuits as if they were legitimate telecommunica-
tions traffic. An enhanced service provider can, for example, continue to
operate without official sanction because its services can ride "piggyback"
on the lines of a carrier with operational authority. 51 Such action would,
of course, subvert existing operational ground rules. 52 While the PTT is
not likely to monitor the lines of its foreign correspondents, it will notice
revenue attenuation if such interlopers succeed in diverting enough con-
ventional (basic services) traffic from the public switched network. Such
unsanctioned resale and enhanced services make the possibility for eased
restrictions to foreign locales even less likely.
Confusion Resulting from the Absence of Universal Service
Definitions
Another problem lies in the disparity between American and foreign
definition of services. For example, a United States enhanced service that
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must be provided on an unregulated basic may merely constitute a new
PTT service option. Generally, PTTs and international telecommunications
fora assume that a new computerized service, which can be linked to
telecommunications lines, constitutes an extension of the already available
services. Because a PTT provides all telecommunications (basic services),
it will incorporate any computerized innovation, including enhanced ser-
vices, as a communications option if additional revenues will accrue. For
example, PTTs and international fora are currently working on a way to
incorporate services that enable terminals operating at incompatible trans-
mission speeds, codes, or protocols to communicate on an "on-line" and
"real time" basis.
Notwithstanding the FCC's goal of promoting the capacity of enhanced
service providers to tailor their offerings to the particular needs of an
individual customer in an unregulated environment, the PTT and interna-
tional fora strive to establish worldwide standards and rules that institu-
tionalize as "communications" those enhanced services which most closely
parallel existing telecommunications offerings: e.g., "teletext," a higher
speed telex service that incorporates a variety of data manipulation, con-
version and "store-and-forward" service options. 53 Other more exotic and
customer-specific enhanced services are likely to be deemed data process-
ing which will not be provided by the PTT or recognized as a telecommuni-
cations service in international fora, even though United States
communications common carriers will provide these services along with
their other conventionally regulated, basic offerings. 54
FCC EXTENSION OF THE SECOND COMPUTER
INQUIRY TO INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
In deciding whether to apply the semantic distinctions of the Second Computer
Inquiry to the international telecommunications and data processing mar-
ketplace, the FCC was presented with the Hobson's choice of: (1) preserv-
ing the philosophical and categorical integrity of a major
domestic-oriented policy pronouncement despite international confusion
and operational problems, or (2) qualifying its international application,
which would cause confusion and operational problems for United States
carriers, many of which serve both domestic and international markets,
and thereby undercutting Commission efforts to limit its regulatory juris-
diction over information processing services. The Commission opted to
maintain a uniform limit to its common carrier jurisdiction. 55 In so doing,
it freed international enhanced service vendors from traditional common
carrier regulation 56 and, in effect, authorized the de facto resale of interna-
tional lines.
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The FCC first addressed the international application of the Second Com-
puter Inquiry when it reviewed the applications of two United States carriers
for authorization, pursuant to Section 214 of the Communications Act, 
5 7
to extend their domestic enhanced packet-switched data communications
networks internationally. 5 8 While packet switching does not by itself
-constitute an enhanced service, 59 as the technology involved can be used
solely to provide a more efficient method of message switching and rout-
ing, 60 the applications of GTE-Telenet Communications Corp. (Telenet)
and Tymnet, Inc. (Tymnet) clearly involved "an existing enhanced service
as currently constituted." 
61
United States Definitions Fail to Win Universal Acceptance
The principal problem raised by the two applications was, however, the
international ramifications Of applying the Second Computer Inquiry abroad
rather than an assessment of whether the Telenet and Tymnet services fell
within the enhanced services definition. 62 Telenet and Tymnet actively
sought Commission Section 214 approval as international common carriers
because of their perception that a Commission "refusal to certify interna-
tional enhanced service providers would prevent [such] firms ... from
negotiating directly with foreign administrations and thereby [would]
frustrate Commission policies of encouraging new entrants .... ," 63 The two
enterprises had, however, already acquired at least one foreign operating
agreement prior to Commission action.
The attractiveness of such a status probably stemmed more from the
firms' perception that Commission approval was necessary to protect the
trouble-free right to lease transmission capacity from existing United
States international carriers rather than the actual need to acquire suitable
credentials to negotiate operating agreements with foreign PTTs. Conceiv-
ably, operating United States international carriers could foreclose the
most attractive avenues for an enhanced service market by asserting that
their obligation to lease bulk transmission capacity applies only to a select
group of "authorized users" 64 and common carriers. Without an official
seal of approval, unregulated international enhanced service providers
could be classified collectively in the dubious basic transmission capacity
reseller category, 65 irrespective of whether they provide enhanced, 
6 6 com-
puterized non-common carrier services or conventional basic services
while evading traditional regulatory oversight. Most United States inter-
national carriers impose tariff restrictions that prohibit the resale of their
leased lines, which is exactly what a non-common carrier enhanced service
provider must do to market its unregulated services. The success of any
resale tariff prohibition depends, however, on the willingness and capacity
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of United States international basic service carriers to scrutinize requests
for lines and to monitor their use.
The FCC attempted to skirt the question of resale by concluding that
"it would be inappropriate for us to address this issue in the current
proceeding." 67 Throughout the Second Computer Inquiry, the Commission
attempted to develop uniform basic and enhanced service definitions and
to foster a "generic finding under Title II of the [Communications] Act." 6 8
Having "delineated those services which are outside the scope of Title
II, ' 69 the Commission concluded that without exception all "enhanced
services are not common carrier services." 70 Accordingly, "[n]o differen-
tiation was [to be] made among various enhanced services in determining
the parameters of Title II regulation," 71 even if some enhanced service
vendors might find it difficult to acquire necessary transmission capacity.
Not only did the FCC avoid considering the international ramifications
of a completely unregulated set of enhanced services, it emphatically de-
clined to assert jurisdiction over any non-communications services even if
some type of supervision was necessary to legitimate them in the eyes of
foreign PTTs. The Commission in effect announced that any enhanced
service vendor that could secure transmission capacity, notwithstanding
carrier tariff prohibitions on line resale, was free to proceed without re-
striction. Whether the transaction between the enhanced service vendor
and the end-user constitutes line resale in terms of FCC policy 72 is now
academic because a new class of legitimate and unregulated enhanced
services vendors has been identified. The Commission's regulatory for-
bearance obligates it to refrain in the future from assessing whether value-
enhancing computerization constitutes a truly enhanced service or the
functional equivalent to an existing basic service. Because some users may
be indifferent as between basic and enhanced service options, as long as
rates are competitive, new enhanced service vendors will be competing
with existing basic service carriers for some of the same customers. Thus
the enhanced service enterprise that has packaged its offerings in such a
manner as to evade FCC regulations may nonetheless be a competitor of
conventional carriers and PT-s.
The FCC has determined that the entire class of enhanced service prov-
iders falls outside its jurisdiction, notwithstanding their likely penetration
of the basic services market and the Commission's express reservation of
judgment as to whether international resale should be left completely
unregulated. Enhanced service vendors can infiltrate supposedly limited
United States and foreign markets because of the similarity between some
enhanced services and conventional offerings and the inadequacy of line
monitoring. For example, the proliferation of telex-type resellers, many of
which operate without any FCC certification or approval, 73 resulted from
poor private line monitoring by underlying carriers. Furthermore, AT&T,
IMPACT OF REGULATION ON INT'L COMMUNICATIONS 201
which predominately provides the usage sensitive international public
switched telephone network, welcomes resale actively used for interna-
tional record services because it stimulates usage, and until quite recently,
AT&T had been prohibited from providing non-voice services. 74 Conse-
quently, the creation of an unfettered international enhanced service mar-
ketplace threatens many institutionalized and protected service
categories. 7
5
FCC Promotion Of An Unregulated Enhanced
Services Marketplace Creates International Problems
Increases in the number of vendors and services, even if strictly limited to
enhanced services, threaten the PTT's control over services and revenues.
This threat will arouse vigorous foreign challenges to the FCC's unilateral
edicts, many of which could also be detrimental to American carriers and
customers.
The resolution to these international problems does not lie in qualifying
or redefining basic and enhanced services. Rather, it lies in devising a
mechanism whereby enterprises proposing to provide truly enhanced ser-
vices may secure the right to acquire transmission capacity from United
States international common carriers and may obtain proper credentials to
negotiate operating agreements with foreign carriers. Without some type
of official certification, enhanced service providers of all nationalities may
cause substantial confusion.
Telenet and Tymnet correctly asserted that unsanctioned and un-
regulated American providers of enhanced services would find few legiti-
mate service opportunities in foreign locales, particularly if they seek to
establish a presence with resale services that are comparable to basic inter-
national service options. The solution lies in working with PTTs to devise
a universal system for identifying and accepting enhanced services that
will augment and complement existing international communications ser-
vices. The successful integration of new United States-sponsored en-
hanced services will not occur until such offerings can raise additional
revenues for PTTs rather than reduce present revenues by diverting traffic
from conventional modes of message transmission.
The pseudo-enhanced services vendors, operating without United
States or foreign sanction in a manner that exploits private line resale and
diverts traffic from basic service routes, jeopardizes the acceptability of
other innovative enhanced services. Because the United States has failed
to devise a system that can distinguish between the two, various PTIs
have announced the possibility of restricting the availability of private line
access to all American carriers and customers. Moreover, the opportunity
for an expanded number of foreign operating agreements with new United
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States carriers and basic or enhanced service resellers may be foreclosed if
the PTrs perceive greater ease and profitability in conferring no more than
one operating agreement for new and existing services. 76
The Second Computer Inquiry program for unregulated international en-
hanced services may also have a deleterious effect in the United States as
well. Despite serious efforts within the United States to enforce reciprocity
among nations so that foreign carriers will not be permitted to operate in
the United States unless American carriers are granted similar rights
abroad, 77 an unregulated enhanced services environment may, in effect,
permit foreign carriers and enhanced services providers to penetrate the
American market without the same restrictions faced by American firms
in the foreign locale. Conceivably, a foreign enterprise, by packaging its
offerings as enhanced services, could set up shop in the United States
without seeking any sort of FCC authorization. Once in place, the foreign
entity's services, whether of the truly enhanced variety or not, would
doubtless compete to some extent with existing United States international
carriers' services. Moreover, to the extent that the foreign enhanced ser-
vices entity has ties at home with the national PTT, arrangements might
be made to route international traffic between the United States and the
home country exclusively through the foreign entity. Perhaps, also, these
international switched services could be offered on more attractive terms
than is possible for the American carriers. 78
The foreign enhanced services provider, in conjunction with its corpo-
rate alter ego or PTT correspondent at home, would thus be able to offer
a complete set of end-to-end services between the United States and
abroad free from any FCC regulation. Given the regulations and restric-
tions under which American international carriers must operate and the
ability of a foreign entity to make exclusive arrangements with its home
country counterparts, it is quite likely that traffic could be substantially
diverted from United States carriers and enhanced service providers. In its
quest to promote an "improved communications system with more choices
for consumers, more diverse service offerings, and lower rates," 79 the FCC
thus may have injured its primary beneficiaries.
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF THE SECOND COMPUTER
INQUIRY TO ACCOMODATE THE INTERNATIONAL
MARKETPLACE
In view of the substantial problems discussed earlier, the FCC must estab-
lish some oversight and control of the international enhanced services
market apart from its traditional Title II common carrier jurisdiction. To
a great extent, both a jurisdictional basis and an adequate system for
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oversight already exist. The Commission has retained two jurisdictional
ties to the enhanced services market. While the FCC expressly refrained
from applying a comprehensive regulatory scheme to enhanced services,
it held (1) that it had ancillary jurisdiction 80 under Title I of the Communi-
cations Act 81 and (2) that Title II jurisdiction would apply to the manner
in which underlying carriers supplied transmission capacity to providers
of enhanced services. Without abandoning its reliance on marketplace
forces, 8 2 the Commission can give special attention to particular aspects
of the international enhanced services market. Indeed, the Commission has
already noted that AT&T's provision of such services required special
regulatory action by ordering the formation of a completely separate sub-
sidiary. 8 3
Ancillary Jurisdiction as a Vehicle for Necessary Oversight
The assertion of limited ancillary jurisdiction over international enhanced
services, within the context of Title I of the Communications Act, would
constitute a legitimate application of FCC oversight, but "only insofar as
such offerings affect ... traditional Title II concerns." 8 4 In upholding the
Commission's Second Computer Inquiry scheme, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized the need for ancillary jurisdiction:
Once the difficulty of isolating activities subject to Title II regulation out-
weighs the benefits to be gained by that regulation, then the Commission is
justified in conserving its energies for more efficacious undertakings, at least
when it establishes an alternative regulatory scheme under its ancillary juris-
diction. 85
In its Second Computer Inquiry decision, the FCC realized that its promotion
of competition in communications markets might warrant some degree of
Commission oversight of new markets that contain an identifiable tele-
communications component, even though they do not warrant the full
application of Title II regulation. 86 The Commission stated:
We seek to make clear on reconsideration that it is not our intent in this
proceeding to assert that any service or activity in which communications is
a component is within the subject matter jurisdiction of Section 2(a) of [Title
I] of the Communications Act. On the other hand, we do not here exclude
a priori all enhanced services from within the scope of Section 2(a) of the Act
either. 87
United States courts have tended to avoid second guessing the FCC's
wisdom in asserting or denying jurisdiction. 88 In approving the Commis-
sion's First Computer Inquiry and its limited assertion of jurisdiction over
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common carrier provision of data processing services, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that:
even absent explicit reference in the statute [i.e., the Communications Act],
the expansive power of the Commission in the electronic communications
field includes the jurisdictional authority to regulate carrier activities in an
area as intimately related to the communications including that of computer
services where such activity may substantially affect the efficient provision
of reasonably priced communications services. 89
Without permitting "unfettered discretion to regulate or not regulate com-
mon carrier services," courts will defer to a regulatory agency's "alternative
regulatory scheme [that will] more effectively further the goals of the
Act." 90
In CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 91 the Supreme Court affirmed FCC jurisdiction over
the three major television networks to facilitate the implementation of
congressional intent to create a limited right of reasonable access to the
broadcast media by legally qualified candidates seeking federal elective
office under Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act. 92 The networks
were held to be bound directly by the Communications Act's mandate,
rather than solely through the indirect regulation of their owned and
operated stations, because the Commission and the courts feared that
Section 312(a)(7) would lose much of its intended strength if candidates
had to assemble their own coverage on an individual, station-by-station
basis. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:
Even if Section 312(a)(7) by itself does not afford the Commission power to
mandate reasonable network access, such jurisdiction is "reasonably ancil-
lary" to the effective enforcement of the individual licensee's Section
312(a)(7) obligations and hence, within the Commission's statutory authori-
ty. 93
Neither the petitioners nor the Supreme Court, on certiorari, questioned
the FCC's application of "reasonably ancillary" jurisdiction over the na-
tional networks as necessary for effective enforcement of the obligations
of individual broadcast licensees under section 312(a)(7). 94
Title H1 Jurisdiction Over Underlying Carriers
The terms and conditions under which providers of enhanced services can
acquire necessary transmission capacity affects their attractiveness in the
marketplace. If they are denied the option of leasing private lines, then the
need to resort to AT&T's international public switched network will
reduce the flexibility, diversity, and cost effectiveness of enhanced ser-
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vices. The FCC has already asserted its jurisdiction to compel domestic
common carriers to lease publicly available transmission capacity to prov-
iders of both basic and enhanced services. 95 Logically, then, the FCC can
also employ its Title II jurisdiction over United States' international carri-
ers to regulate the basis on which enhanced services providers acquire
international transmission lines to foreign locales and their access to Unit-
ed States domestic carrier networks. This assertion of jurisdiction is neces-
sary if the FCC is to identify all providers of enhanced serices and to
monitor their performance.
Section 205 of the Communications Act 96 empowers the FCC to deter-
mine and prescribe fair and reasonable terms, conditions, and rates for
American communication common carriers. Through oversight of the
transmission line and the underlying carrier, the Commission can exercise
indirect control over unregulated subsidiaries, resellers, and providers of
enhanced services. 97 To be sure, the carrier is, to a great degree, not
responsible for the activities of its lessee, and may, as noted earlier, be
unable or unwilling to monitor how its lines are being used. The Commis-
sion can, however, attempt to require greater scrutiny by licensed carriers
of their noncarrier lessees' proposed plans to use transmission lines. The
underlying carrier cannot act as a surrogate regulatory agency, but, as an
interested intermediary and probable competitor, it can assess the plans of
enhanced service vendors to ensure that they do not violate United States
or international laws or operational practices. 98 Up to now, the carrier has
had to detect illegal or improper activity and to petition the Commission
to order that the practice cease or that the carrier be given the right to
terminate service. The FCC should place the burden instead on the vendor
of enhanced services to demonstrate that it intends a legitimate use of
transmission lines, that will not violate domestic or foreign policies or
rules.
With the underlying carrier ordered to play a more active role in evalu-
ating the proposed service, the Commission will have employed a front-
line guardian. Any unreasonably self-serving practices by carriers can be
remedied by a petition to the FCC from the vendor of enhanced services
that has been denied service or subjected to discriminatory treatment. By
placing the burden to prove unfair treatment on the vendor of enhanced
services, the Commission will have established itself as the proper forum,
pursuant to Title II of the Act, to correct improper carrier practices, while
securing a degree of oversight and control over the potentially illegal and
injurious practices of illegitimate enhanced service providers.
206 REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESOLVING
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
Until the advent of fully integrated international telecommunication net-
work, United States governmental agencies must assist American non-
common carriers in gaining access to foreign markets through active par-
ticipation in international planning and policy-making fora. Given the
FCC's own difficulty in establishing a set of domestic criteria for the
regulatory treatment of data processing, the broad extension of this
scheme internationally will be delayed as United States and foreign plan-
ners struggle over universal definitions, standards, and operational prac-
tices and procedures. It is essential that American vendors of enhanced
services participate in this process, particularly because their market entry
has been perceived as a threat to PTT revenues and sovereignty. 99
Because United States providers of enhanced service lease communica-
tions capacity, which they combine with computerization, their legitimacy
has been questioned because of their resemblance to bulk-line capacity
resellers. 100 Most truly enhanced services constitute, however, a new set
of offerings that do not duplicate existing basic services. They can thus
generate additional revenue for the PTT even though the service depends
on line leasing or bulk line reconfiguration, arguably a type of resale.
Nevertheless, the American entrepreneur, operating without a foreign
agreement and providing bogus enhanced services which are nothing more
than existing basic services, can cause real harm to the PTT, legitimate
American carriers and enhanced service vendors, and foreign relations.
Without undermining the grand policies of the Second Computer Inquiry or
expanding the scope of its Title II jurisdiction, the FCC must devise a
mechanism to identify and supervise the international marketing efforts of
legitimate enhanced services enterprises that offer more than basic services
and the resale of international leased lines. By distinguishing between
vendors of enhanced service and the mere reseller of basic services, the
FCC will have signaled to its foreign counterparts that it has taken efforts
to identify that subset of potential or existing market entrants that deserve
foreign consideration as communications/data processing correspondents.
Under existing ITU conventions and standards, the United States De-
partment of State designates American communications firms as recog-
nized Private Operating Agencies (RPOA), 101 affording them the
opportunity to participate in various international planning activities
sponsored by the ITU through its Consultative Committees. The RPOA
status has, in turn, often depended on the prior acquisition of FCC section
214 certification, although there appears to be no ITU or American policy
mandating this prerequisite. For example, GTE-Telenet, Inc. had par-
ticipated in ITU proceedings prior to receiving FCC international common
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carrier certification. 102 Hence, a mechanism already exists for FCC and
State Department registration of legitimate vendors of enhanced services
and notification of foreign counterparts.
The FCC will not appear to have approved the defacto international resale
and shared use of all international services if, instead of a completely
hands-off approach to international enhanced services, it indicates a will-
ingness to lend its "good offices" for the registration of truly enhanced
service vendors. Likewise, the FCC and other United States government
agencies must resolve to participate in international fora and to embrace
a long-term commitment to the smooth and effective introduction of new
services. Once the Commission commits itself to ongoing consultation
with the State Department to identify the providers of enhanced services
who are most willing to play by existing operational rules, then the United
States government will be better able to convince the foreign PTTs that the
United States approach will not interfere with the PTTs' sole provision of
such services on the other end, nor injure PTT sovereignty and financial
security. 103
Although FCC regulation of enhanced services providers affects only
the domestic legal status of American entities providing international ser-
vice, the FCC and other United States governmental agencies must be
aware how their edicts affect foreign correspondents and the response such
policies will provoke. Consultation benefits both parties, but this obligates
the United States government, acting in concert with commercial enter-
prises, to play a more active role in planning for the future, preparing for
international planning conferences, and staffing the United States delega-
tion with experts from various disciplines and constituencies in addition
to the various regulatory and administration officials and figureheads.
To secure a major stake in the information age, United States officials
must appreciate conflicting foreign philosophies, technical and operational
practices, and industrial structures. Given such substantial differences, a
regulatory scheme primarily geared for the domestic United States tele-
communications and data processing marketplace cannot be summarily
announced and unilaterally imposed. Only after an in-depth dialogue with
foreign counterparts will the FCC and other United States communications
policy-making bodies finally be in a position to modify the Second Computer
Inquiry and to refine United States policy initiatives to accommodate new
technologies and expedite their entry into the international marketplace.
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sight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 822 (1977)(statement of Anthony G. Oettinger, Director,
Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University).
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to foster full interconnection between all domestic and international record carrier networks.
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See Frieden, International Telecommunications and the Federal Communications Commission, 21 COL. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 423, 466-80 (1983). The Congressional resolve to foster a more competitive
record services marketplace nevertheless obligated the FCC to oversee the manner by which
American carriers fostered network access, including services which involve message storing,
forwarding and conversion from one format into another. The Commission acknowledged
that these ancillary services fall within the enhanced services definition under the Second
Computer Inquiry. See Interconnection Arrangements Between and Among Domestic and Record
Carriers: Store-and-Forward and TWX/Telex Conversion, CC Docket No. 82-122, FCC 83-84
at para. 44 (released March 16, 1983).
As a result of the routine carrier practice of integrating basic and enhanced services into
one offering, the FCC faced a regulatory dilemma. It could insist on the semantic purity of
its basic/enhanced services dichotomy or qualify the application of the Second Computer Inquiry
to accommodate operational realities. Rather than inject unnecessary inconvenience and
logistical problems, the FCC "conclude[d] that the RCCA carves out a limited exception to
the broader treatment of such issues in Computer II." Id. at n.21, see also id. at 50. Because
Congress identified "traditional" record services as subject to FCC oversight, the Commission
could maintain necessary common carrier and ratemaking regulatory purview over integral,
albeit "enhanced" components of conventional United States international record carrier
services without expanding its purview over nonintegrated enhanced offerings like high-
speed data services. Only though crafty statutory interpretation was the FCC able to find a
plausible resolution to cases where service definitions and regulatory schemes do not jibe with
the actual means by which carriers package international telecommunications services.
55 See Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-03 (1976)(confers
broad jurisdiction on the FCC to regulate interstate and foreign communications common
carrier services by wire or radio, including the power to review and prescribe the terms,
conditions, and rates for services). See generally J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBUC UIuT RATEs
(1969); P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEjOY, PuBuc UTILTY ECONOMICS (1964); A. PRIEST, PR CIPLES OF
PuBuc UTILITY RECULATION: THEORY AND APPLICATION (1969).
56 However, the Commission did not relinquish its oversight of enhanced services. See infra
notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
57 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1976) ("[n]o carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line
or of an extension of any line, or shall acquire or operate any line... unless and until there
shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future
public convenience and necessity require or will require ... such additional or extended
line.").
58 Application of the GTE Telenet Communications Corp., File No. I-T-t-81-274, Mimeo
No. 2765 (F.C.C. Mar. 15, 1982) (application for authority to extend its packet-switched
telecommunications services from the continental U.S. to Europe and elsewhere) [hereinafter
cited as Telenet Authorization ]; Application of Tymnet, Inc., File No. I-T-C-82-210 (F.C.C. Apr.
8, 1982), on review FCC 82-377, Mimeo No. 31855 (F.C.C. Aug. 25, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
Telenet/Tymnet Authorization Review ], on reconsideration, [hereinafter cited as Telemet/Tymnet Authori-
zation Reconsideration ].
59 "[M]essage or packet switching ... is a store and forward technology that may be
employed in providing basic services." Second Computer Inquiry-Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d at 421,
n. 35.
6 0 See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
91 F.C.C.2d 1 (1982)(consideration of AT&T's domestic Bell Packet Switching Service and
its ties with American Bell's enhanced services).
61 Telenet Authorization, supra note 58, at 4.
62 The Commission granted a short-lived authorization until January 1, 1983, pursuant
to 47 U.S.C. 1 214, see supra note 57, because the Second Computer Inquiry established a transition
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period for the "de-tariffing" of all enhanced services that were being offered prior to Decem-
ber 30, 1980, the effective date of Second Computer Inquiry-Reconsideration. If Telenet and Tymnet
had not already provided such a service domestically, they would not have acquired even this
temporary certification.
63 Telenet Authorization, supra note 58, at 3. Another new international record service carrier
applicant, Consortium Communications International Inc., was informed that it, and similiar-
ly situated entities that provide store and forward telex-type services over leased lines, are
engaged in common carrier activities for hire and thus fall within the Commission's jurisdic-
tion under Titles I and II of the Act. IT World Communications, Inc. v. Consortium Com-
munications International, Inc., 76 F.C.C.2d 15 (1980); accord In re International Relay, Inc., 77
F.C.C.2d 819, modified on reconsideration, 82 F.C.C. 2d 41 (1980).
Hence, the common carrier label is available to enterprises that opt to provide basic
services, even if they use and reconfigure lines leased from other carriers. Many enterprises
have failed to secure any FCC sanction even though they duplicate existing services.
64 Initially developed to structure satellite capacity conveyancing with one wholesaler
(COMSAT) dealing directly with only a few authorized users who then retail services to end
users, the concept has been expanded to establish limits to the obligation of common carriers
to provide particular types of transmission capacity to non-common carriers. See In re Author-
ized Entities and Authorized Users Under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 4
F.C.C.2d 421, 427 (1966), clarified, 6 F.C.C.2d 593 (1967) (establishing limited, unique and
exceptional instances under which non-carrier can acquire satellite services directly from
COMSAT), policy reviewed, In re Aeronautical Radio, Inc., 77 F.C.C.2d 535 (1980), policy revised
in Proposed Modifications of the Commission's Authorized User Policy Concerning Access
to the International Satellite Services of the Communications Satellite Corp., 90 F.C.C.2d
1394 (1982) (permitting COMSAT to serve end users of satellite services via a separate
subsidiary, and to make facilities and servicesdirectly available to major non-carrier users,
e.g., a world-wide airline reservation service), vacated and remanded sub. nom, 1T World Comm.,
Inc. v. FCC, No. 79-1046, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 1984)(Comsat cannot retail international
satellite services until the FCC acts on other policy initiatives that could enable other interna-
tional carriers to operate more efficiently by individual ownership of international earth
stations and direct cost-based access to INTELSAT satellite capacity).
65 "Underlying carriers" own interstate or foreign telecommunications capacity and lease
it to end users or resale entities which broker bulk capacity or package computer enhancing
services to basic line capacity. They object to the existence of resellers, who can siphon
revenue away and "create pressure on the underlying carrier to set rates for the discounted
service which do not fully recover the costs of providing that service." In re Regulatory
Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic Public Switched
Network Services, 83 F.C.C.2d 167, 169 (1980). The history of regulatory and judicial action
mandating domestic resale is replete with cases where underlying carriers have refused to
convey capacity or done so only on discriminatory terms and conditions. See, e.g., Regulatory
Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Services and Facilities, 47 F.C.C.2d
644 (1974) (notice of inquiry), 48 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976) (liberal resale policy announced),
modified, 61 F.C.C.2d 70, further modifications, 62 F.C.C.2d 588, (1977), aff'd sub nom. American
Telephone and Telegraph v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
On the international side, FCC action is limited to the release of a notice of proposed
rulemaking. See Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier
International Communications Services, 77 F.C.C. 2d 831 (1980). The Commission has in-
dicated that it "has made no findings as to the lawfulness of [underlying carrier] international
tariff provisions which restrict the third party use of international facilities." ITT, 76 F.C.C.2d
at 21. The Commission would place the burden on those carriers to enforce their tariff
provisions in the first instance.
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66 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
67 Second Computer Inquiry-Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d at 489.
68 Telenet/Tymnet Authorization Review, supra note 58, at 7 113.
69 Second Computer Inquiry-Reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d at 90. A preceding section of the
opinion discussed Title l's scope, noting that "[t]he basic/enhanced dichotomy is applicable
to both domestic and international services provided over common carrier facilities." Id. at
53 n.4.
70 Id. at 89.
71 Telenet/Tymnet Authorization Review, supra note 58, at 6 112.
72 See generally supra note 65. Resale transmission capacity would present the opportunity
for arbitrage-"the purchase of a product or service in one market [here, bulk private line
transmission capacity] for the purpose of immediate resale in another market." Regulatory
Policies, 83 F.C.C.2d at 168 n.3. Arbitrage "could help insure that rates are cost-based." Id. at
168.
73 See supra note 63.
74 See supra note 52. AT&T recently applied to eliminate restrictions on the shared use or
resale of its international message telephone service network. See Application of AT&T Long
Lines, No. 14078 (F.C.C. Aug. 6, 1982) (to amend FCC Tariff No. 263).
75 Enterprises using leased private lines or an international message telephone service
network can arrange services so that they constitute cheaper substitutes to underlying carri-
ers' existing array of retail services. Resellers can employ computerization to make message
transmission more efficient and therefore less expensive.
The Director of the CCITT has expressed his concern that the Commission's Second Computer
Inquiry and its decision to consider enhanced services as unregulated offerings constitutes a
defacto approval of unlimited resale and shared use of international lines. FCC Chairman Mark
Fowler responded by stating that underlying carrier tariff provisions governing third-party
use of their facilities exist and are "currently enforceable by individual carriers and the
Commission." Letter from Mark Fowler, Chairman of the FCC, to Leon Buttz, CCITT Direc-
tor (October 20, 1982)[hereinafter cited as Letter from Fowler]; cf. ITT, 76 F.C.C.2d at 21
(Commission has made no findings as to the lawfulness of international tariff provisions
which restrict third-party use of international facilities). The Chairman recognized "[t]hat
there may be existing limitations on the use of common carrier facilities that serve to restrict
the manner in which... [enhanced] services may be provided," but declared that the FCC
was not of the mind to qualify its Second Computer Inquiry policies to accommodate such
international qualifications. Letter from Fowler.
76 A number of foreign governments have intimated that they are contemplating the
development of sole source or limited source operating agreements with U.S. carriers. In the
summer of 1982, the Nordic governments representing Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden contacted the seven major U.S. international service carriers to solicit proposals for
the provision of packet-switched services between the U.S. and Scandinavia. State Depart-
ment and FCC officials expressed concern over the possibility that only one or two U.S.
carriers would be afforded the opportunity to participate in new enhanced and advanced basic
service markets.
This concern with exclusive dealing led the Western Union Telegraph Co. to indicate
publicly that its Teletext agreement with the West German Bundespost did not contemplate
that Western Union would serve as the sole source of U.S. originated high speed telex
services. Western Union went so far as to state its willingness to accept authorization of its
Teletext application with the express proviso that its agreement with the West German
Bundespost be considered nonexclusive. See generally 48 TELECOM. REP. 24 (1982).
77 See In re The French Telegraph Cable Co., 71 F.C.C.2d 393 (1979). The Commission had
adopted a reciprocal national treatment policy. The French PTT refused to allow U.S. carriers
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to maintain operating offices in France, and also refused to grant additional operating agree-
ments with U.S. carriers. The FCC retaliated by refusing to permit the expansion of French
Cable's gateway operating authority in the U.S. The Commission subsequently approved
transfer of ownership in French Cable's U.S. operations to a domestic holding company. See
FTC Communications, Inc., 75 F.C.C.2d 15 (1979). Compare id. at 29 (dissent by Comm'r
Fogarty).
78 Concerned with the superior bargaining strength of foreign governments (given their
capacity to control the flow of traffic destined for the United States, and to play one U.S.
carrier against another to curry the PTTs favor and acquire a larger volume of inbound traffic),
the FCC requires all international carriers under its jurisdiction to employ the same monetary
figure for purposes of toll revenue sharing. While a carrier may alter the collection rate-the
tariff rate charged to its customers-it must employ the same figure all carriers use to
determine how much money must be shared between U.S. and foreign correspondents for
routes to foreign destinations. The rate is usually divided in half when carriers settle accounts.
See In re Uniform Settlement Rules on Parallel International Communications Routes, 66
F.C.C.2d 359, 364 (1977), policy reaff'd, 84 F.C.C.2d 121, 122 (1981); see also MacKay Radio and
Telegraph Co., 2 F.C.C. 592, 599 (1936), affd sub nom. MacKay Radio and Telegraph Co., Inc.
v. FCC, 97 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ("To rely upon.., competitors not to make concessions
[which would weaken the U.S. carrier or result in higher tariff rates for U.S. customers is]
to provide an exceedingly tenuous basis upon which to rest the public interest.")
Foreign carriers and self-proclaimed enhanced services vendors not under FCC jurisdic-
tion are not subject to the uniform accounting rate requirement. Accordingly, they will be
free to make lucrative revenue sharing deals which U.S. carriers cannot match. When TRT
Telecommunications Corp., a U.S. carrier, acquired authorization to serve the United King-
dom, it was required to submit to the FCC an operating agreement which was "consistent
with similar agreements in effect between the [British Post Office, the U.S. international
record carrier's foreign correspondent] and other U.S. carriers." TRT Telecommunications
Corp., 46 F.C.C.2d 1042, 1056 (1974).
New U.S. common carriers will have to acquire and price international transmission
capacity consistent with the uniform rate.
79 American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 75 F.C.C. 2d 682, 688 (1980), aff'd sub nom.
Western Union Int'l, Inc. v. FCC, 673 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
80 The FCC can regulate community antenna television (i.e., cable television) as "adjuncts
of the nation's broadcasting system." Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359
F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Jurisdiction is limited to that which is "reasonably ancillary
to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities." United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (affirming ancillary jurisdiction over cable
television to protect local broadcasting and to further the policies established for broadcast
regulation). The Commission can assert or forbear from asserting all or part of its broad
regulatory authority over new technologies and services (like cable television) that affect or
are linked to existing regulated services. In affirming the First Computer Inquiry regulatory
regime, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held:
The rules we are now considering are generically based upon the primary charge of
the Commission that its carriers provide efficient and economic service to the public.
The burgeoning data processing activities of the common carriers pose, in the view of
the Commission, a threat to efficient public communications services at reasonable
prices and hence regulation is justified under its broad rulemaking authority. Second
Computer Inquiry-Affirmance, 693 F.2d at 2.
81 Title I of the Communications Act grants the FCC general jurisdiction so as "to make
available .... to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and
worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
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charges . 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). Enhanced services and CPE also fall within the scope
of Title I, which gives the Commission jurisdiction over "all instrumentalities, facilities,
apparatus, and services ... incidental to" interstate and foreign communication by wire or
radio. 47 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153(a) &; see also Second Computer Inquiry-Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d at
450-52; Second Computer Inquiry-Affirmance, 693 F.2d at 214.
82 See Second Computer Inquiry--Final Decision, 77 F.C.C. 2d at 433.
83 See id. at 469; Second Computer Inquiry-Reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d at 71-75.
84 Second Computer Inquiry-Reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d at 93.
85 Second Computer Inquiry-Af/irmance, 693 F.2d at 211.
86 Second Computer Inquiry-Reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d at 87-91.
87 Id. at 92.
88 See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 674 F.2d 160, 165-66 (2d Cir. 1982) ("the
Commission has broad discretion to choose which regulatory tools to employ ... and its
decision must be upheld unless it is irrational..."); see also FCC v. iNNCN Listeners Guild,
450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (Commission's judgment on "how the public interest is best served
is entitled to substantial judicial deference."); Second Computer Inquiry-Affirmance, 693 F.2d at
214 (Commission's "choice of regulatory tools ...must be upheld unless arbitrary or
capricious."); General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 853
(5th Cir. 1971)(Congress created a broad mandate in the Communications Act "to endow the
Commission with sufficiently elastic powers such that it could readily accommodate dynamic
new developments in the field of communications.").
89 GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1973).
90 Second Computer Inquiry-Afrmance, 693 F.2d at 212.
91 629 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
92 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)(1976)(enacted as the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-225, § 103(a)(2)(A), 86 Stat. 3, 4 (1972), amending the Communications Act of
1934).
93 CBS, 629 F.2d at 26.
94 Id., 453 U.S. at 391 n.14.
95 See supra note 46.
96 47 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1976).
97 Although the Commission does not have direct jurisdiction over a subscriber who
interconnects with a communications common carrier or a CPE manufacturer, it can apply
§ 205 to exercise indirect oversight by regulating the underlying carrier, and through regula-
tion standards, t9rms, and conditions by which equipment can be attached to a carrier
network. See, e.g., Special Telephone Charges, 10 F.C.C. 252 (1943) (FCC asserted jurisdiction
over hotel surcharge of long distance telephone services because the hotel was deemed an
"agent" of the carrier, so they jointly participated in providing interstate communications
service to hotel patrons without a filed tariff). Compare Ambassador, Inc. v. United States, 325
U.S. 317, 326 (1945) (the Court held it was unnecessary to determine whether the hotel was
an agent because, whatever the relationship, it was subject to reasonable FCC regulation
under the Commission's power to review and approve the telephone company tariffs). Cf. 47
C.F.R. §§ 68 et seq. (1980) (equipment registration rules and regulations); American Telephone
& Telegraph Co., 75 F.C.C.2d 682 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Western Union, 673 F.2d 539 (D.D.C.
1982) (policy on use of CPE to convert international message telephone service network into
a vehicle for data transmission).
98 See supra note 49.
99 See supra note 75.
100 See supra note 65.
101 See International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. 44, 28 U.S.T.
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2497, 2537, T.I.A.S. 8572 at Annex 2. The ITU defines a Recognized Private Operating Agency
as follows:
"[a]ny individual or company or corporation, other than a government establishment
or agency, which operates a telecommunications installation intended for an interna-
tional telecommunication service [and] which operates a public correspondence or
broadcasting service and upon which the obligations provided for in Article 44 of the
Convention ["to abide the provisions of this Convention and the Administrative
Regulations.. ."] are imposed by the Member in whose territory the head office of
the agency is situated, or by the Member which has authorized this operating agency
to establish and operate a telecommunication service on its territory. Id., 28 U.S.T. at
2643.
102 See supra note 58.
103 The U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has recently
sought to revamp the U.S. international telecommunications policy formation structure and
the underlying objectives governing the process. See International Telecommunication
Deregulation Act, S. 2469, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. 50, 435-43 (1982) (revised
and retitled as the International Telecommunications Act, Calendar No. 961, Nov. 20, 1982);
see also S. REP. No. 669, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
Where feasible, S. 2469 seeks to promote marketplace competition in international tele-
communications and information processing. The bill creates an intergovernmental agency
task force to consolidate the government's participation in the process. The Senate report
endorses the notion that "the FCC should grant private operating agency status to enhanced
service providers that request such status." S. REP. No. 669 at 4. The Report also approves
of the Commission's procedure for certifying telecommunications equipment, noting that it
furnishes a workable mechanism for recognizing and authorizing RPOAs pursuant to art. 44
of the ITU Convention. See 47 C.F.R. § 68 el seq.
